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Abstract
The Copenhagen Document was adopted in the wake of the Cold War, with the
situation of ‘national minorities’ in Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet
States in mind. However, by recognising the potential for the violation of human
rights to lead to conflict, the Copenhagen Document remains relevant to minority
situations throughout the world.
This article explores the increasing relevance of these rights to Muslim minorities
in Western Europe. It is argued that if Western European States wish to proactively
prevent conflict with their Muslim populations, lessons can be learnt from the
approach adopted in the Copenhagen Document. In particular, the emphasis on
encouraging societal cohesion in order to reduce the potential for conflict, through
effective participation in public affairs and intercultural dialogue and tolerance, is a
message that must be heeded by Western European States.
Keywords: Copenhagen Document, Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, Muslim minorities, Western Europe, Integration, Societal Cohesion, Conflict
Prevention
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At the time of its adoption the Copenhagen Document was described as the ‘peak of “standard
setting on national minority issues”’ (Wright, 1998: 4). Although it has subsequently been
overtaken in academic discourse by legal minority rights instruments, the Copenhagen
Document signalled a shift in the approach taken to minority issues in Europe. Whereas the
question of minorities had primarily been approached as a human rights issue in the post-war
period, the Copenhagen Document recognised the nexus between the protection of human
rights and conflict prevention (1990: para 30) and, in so doing, contained a number of
innovative provisions. Specifically, the Copenhagen Document recognised the need to adopt
special measures (1990: para 31; Wright, 1996: 198), the right to self-identify (1990: para 32;
Bloed, 1990: 40), the right to ‘express, preserve and development their ethnic cultural,
linguistic or religious identity … free of any attempts at assimilation against their will’
(1990: para 32; Jackson-Preece, 1997: 90) and that the establishment of ‘local or autonomous
administrations’ may be appropriate to ensure the effective participation of national minorities
in public affairs (1990: para 35). Furthermore, this was the first instrument to add effective
participation to the traditional ‘two pillars’ of minority protection: preservation of minority
identity and non-discrimination and equality. While the Copenhagen Document was adopted
with the situation in Central and Eastern European States and post-Soviet Union States in
mind, its contents remain relevant to minority situations throughout the world.
This article focuses on Muslim minorities in Western Europe. Although it does not
argue that these minorities constitute ‘national minorities’ for the purpose of the Copenhagen
Document, it does argue that their situation is increasingly analogous to that of more
traditional minorities. Muslim minorities now constitute citizens and permanent residents in
Western European States, but with the rise of right-wing politics, Islamophobic discourse and
restrictions on their rights justified by security concerns, these communities are increasingly
marginalised. This, in turn, poses challenges in relation to integration, societal cohesion and
conflict prevention. Whereas research into the rights of ‘new minorities’ has primarily
focused on the challenges of integration and societal cohesion (Medda-Windischer, 2009;
Berry, 2015), this article explores the rights of European Muslims from the perspective of the
security dimension. It is submitted that if Western European States wish to proactively
prevent conflict with their Muslim populations, lessons can be learnt from the approach
adopted in the Copenhagen Document. In particular, there is a need to take proactive steps to
facilitate societal cohesion through intercultural dialogue and tolerance, and the effective
participation of these communities in public affairs.
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Initially, a comparison is made between the situation of national minorities and Muslim
minorities in Western Europe, in order to evaluate whether the aims of the Copenhagen
Document are relevant to Muslim communities. Although there are some significant
differences between national minorities and Muslim minorities, the permanence and
marginalisation of Muslim communities in Western Europe alongside the prospect of conflict
leads to the conclusion that lessons can be learnt from the Copenhagen Document. Secondly,
the relevance of the standards established in the Copenhagen Document to the situation of
Muslim minorities in Western Europe is drawn out, focusing on effective participation in
public affairs (1990: para 35) and intercultural dialogue and tolerance (1990: para 36). It is
argued that by focusing on the equal participation of these communities in society, these
standards aim to increase societal cohesion and thereby reduce the potential for conflict.
However, in practice, Western European States have not fully realised these rights in respect
of their Muslim minorities.
1. Comparing National Minorities and Muslims in Western Europe
This article does not suggest that Muslims in Western Europe fall within the term ‘national
minority’ employed in the Copenhagen Document. As previously noted, the Copenhagen
Document was adopted with the situation of national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union in mind. Furthermore, the suggestion that migrants, including
‘guest workers’ (or Gastarbeiter) in Western Europe, should be included in Chapter IV of the
Copenhagen Document on ‘National Minorities’ was dismissed during the drafting of the
instrument (Helgesen, 1994: 20-21). As a significant proportion of the ‘guest workers’
recruited in the post-war period in Western Europe were Muslim, this resulted in the
exclusion of these communities from the scope of the Copenhagen Document.1 However,
their situation has changed significantly since the 1990s and has begun to resemble that of
national minorities more closely. Consequently, while the Copenhagen Document itself may
not be applicable to Muslim minorities in Western Europe, it is argued that the rights
contained therein are of increasing relevance to these communities. This section will explore
how the situation of Muslim minorities originating from immigration to Western Europe has
evolved, and the key ways in which it corresponds and diverges from the situation of national
minorities. This facilitates the evaluation of the relevance of the Copenhagen Document to
Muslim minorities in Western Europe.
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The exclusion of ‘new minorities’ from the scope of application of minority rights
standards has been justified on the grounds that immigrants were initially expected to
assimilate into their receiving State2 or to return to their State of origin (Davy, 2005, 126).
Citizenship (Capotorti, 1977: para 568) and an element of permanence or ‘longstanding, firm
and lasting ties with’ the State (Capotorti, 1977: para 202) have consistently been cited as
prerequisites of minority rights protection. While the majority of British Muslims would have
satisfied the requirement of citizenship at the time of the adoption of the Copenhagen
Document (Nielsen, 2004: 51-2), other Western European States, such as Germany, were still
systematically denying their Muslim ‘guest workers’ citizenship. However, subsequent
developments such as the Act of German Citizenship of 20003 have meant that the majority of
Muslims in Western Europe are now citizens of the State in which they reside (Nielsen, 2004:
51-2; Choudhury, 2010: 36). This development has thus reduced the legitimacy of arguments
for the denial of minority rights to Muslim minorities based on their lack of citizenship or
permanence. Furthermore, by continuing to practice their religion and maintain their culture, a
significant proportion of the Muslim population in Western Europe have withstood the
pressure to assimilate. Thus, the oft cited requirement of the ‘will to maintain their distinct
identity’ appears to have been satisfied by European Muslims, implicitly. As noted by
Alfredsson ‘[a]t some point ... the newcomers become minorities’ (2005: 167). Consequently,
since the turn of the Century, Muslim communities have increasingly been recognised as
constituting minorities under article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights4 (ICCPR)5 and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
(FCNM)6 (Thornberry and Martin Estébanez, 2004: 95).7 Nonetheless, opposition from some
Western European States to the inclusion of Muslim minorities within the scope of
application of the FCNM remains.8
Muslims in Western Europe are not national minorities, in the sense intended by the
drafters of the Copenhagen Document. Historically the term ‘national minority’ implied a
connection to a kin-State, ‘a larger nation already constituted in a state or in a federated entity
within a federal state’ (Benoît-Rohmer, 1996: 15). Although a common understanding of the
term has not evolved (Benoît-Rohmer, 1996: 15; Malloy, 2005: 21) as indicated by the liberal
approach adopted by the Advisory Committee to the FCNM (AC-FCNM) (Hofmann, 2005:
16),9 the context of the adoption of the Copenhagen Document indicates which minorities
were the intended beneficiaries of Chapter IV. National minorities in Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union had an ethnicity connected to a corresponding kin-State,
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as required by the historical definition. Thus, in the aftermath of the Cold War ‘minority
demands which remained unanswered were identified as potential threats to the post-Cold
War international order’ (Jackson-Preece, 1997: 88). This perceived threat to security
provided the incentive for the adoption of the Copenhagen Document. Notably, minorities
such as the Roma that do not pose a threat to security were originally marginalised within the
CSCE/OSCE system (Wright, 1998: 6).
The national minorities understood to be the focus of the Copenhagen Document
primarily identify on the basis of ethnicity, with a common language or religion and
connection to territory as a corollary of this. In contrast, Muslim minorities in Western
European States, originating primarily from immigration, are ethnically heterogeneous.
Nonetheless, particular ethnic identities are associated with Islam in Western Europe, such as
Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin in the UK, Turkish origin in Germany and Denmark, North
African origin in France and Somali origin throughout Western Europe. This impacts the form
of Islam that is practiced and the language spoken. Religion is often intertwined with the
cultural identity of Muslim communities in Western Europe (Berry, 2011, 439-47). Claims
made by European Muslims to the accommodation of identity, in particular specific forms of
religious clothing or access to linguistic education, may be rooted in both religion and culture
(Berry, 2011, 440-41). Rather than forming one religious minority in Western Europe, the
complexity of European Muslim identity means that they form plural ethnic, linguistic and
religious minorities. Consequently, they are not directly comparable to the intended
beneficiaries of the Copenhagen Document. Moreover, although Muslims in Western Europe
have in many instances settled in similar regions for several decades, influenced by ethnic
origin as well as religion (Yilmaz, 2005: 56), their minority identity is not connected to
territory in the same way as national minority identity. Therefore, the extension of rights on
the basis of a historical connection to territory is not appropriate.
Muslims in Western Europe have not suffered from historical oppression to the same
degree as the national minorities addressed by the Copenhagen Document. For national
minorities ‘[i]n many postcommunist countries, there is a strong sense that historical wrongs
have not yet been acknowledged or remedied’ (Kymlicka, 2008: 28). This, Kymlicka
suggests, justifies an accommodationist, rather than integrationist, approach to the question of
national minorities (2008). In contrast, ‘[i]n deciding to uproot themselves, immigrants
voluntarily relinquish some of the rights that go along with their original national
membership’ (Kymlicka, 1995: 96). Consequently, it is reasonable for States to expect such
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‘new minorities’ to integrate. While an accomodationist approach to national minorities is
preferable, in practice, the majority of the Copenhagen Document’s innovative provisions
adopt an integrationist approach (1990: para 35, 36), with the exception of the second sub-
paragraph of paragraph 35 of the Copenhagen Document, which mandates ‘appropriate local
or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial
circumstances’. Similar integrationist clauses are found in the FCNM,10 an instrument which
has been criticised, alongside the OSCE HCNM’s recommendations for adopting an
integrationist approach to the question of national minorities (Kymlicka, 2008: 30). While a
distinction between the rights of national minorities and ‘new minorities’, including Muslims
in Western Europe, is justifiable, there is less reason to restrict the application of the
integrationist provisions found in the Copenhagen Document, with the exception of the rights
pertaining to territory or autonomy.
Although it can be argued that ‘new minorities’ do not satisfy the elements of the
definition of national minority, if the approach of the OSCE to conflict prevention is to
remain proactive rather than reactive, as intended (Wright, 1996: 192), the similarity between
the situations of new and old minorities should be recognised. Reserving the rights found in
the Copenhagen Document exclusively for national minorities does not recognise the
potential for the oppression of ‘newcomers’ to cause similar problems over time. In noting the
‘security-rights nexus’, Sasse, suggests:
… the focus on security also creates a link between groups recognized as ‘national
minorities’ and recent immigrants. The lack of integration of minorities, however
defined, undermines societal cohesion and can give rise to political mobilization
against the host polity, for example in the form of separatism or fundamentalism.
(2005: 679)
The recognition of the connection between security and human rights lies at the heart of the
OSCE. Notably, paragraph 30 of the Copenhagen Document ‘reaffirm[s] that respect for the
rights of persons belonging to national minorities as part of universally recognized human
rights is an essential factor for peace, justice, stability and democracy in participating States’
(1990: para 30). Thus, to the extent that the provisions of the Copenhagen Document aim to
integrate diverse societies and improve societal cohesion, lessons can be learnt from their
content. Despite being designed to combat a specific situation at a specific time, the
Copenhagen Document has continuing relevance to new and emerging minority situations.
Developments since the 1980s indicate the potential for dissatisfaction amongst some
Muslim communities in Western Europe to lead to conflict. Conflict has a wide meaning and
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does not inevitably lead to violence. Simply defined, ‘conflict denotes the incompatibility of
subject positions’ (Pia and Diez, 2007: 2). If the causes of conflict are not adequately
addressed then there is potential for the resulting dissatisfaction to lead to physical violence
(Pia and Diez, 2007: 2). Prominent examples of conflict with groups within European Muslim
communities include the Rushdie Affair in the UK in 1988, the Danish Cartoon Affair in
2005, peaceful protests in opposition to the Iraq war in 2003, and riots in the North of
England in 2001 and the banlieue of Paris in 2005 and 2007. Furthermore, a rise in anti-
Immigration and Islamophobic political agendas,11 Islamophobic hate speech,12 and
discriminatory media reporting13 in Western Europe has been noted by the AC-FCNM. As a
result of this ‘climate of intolerance’,14 restrictions have increasingly been placed on the
manifestation of Islam in public spaces, including bans on the hijab,15 burqa16 and minarets,17
leading to increased alienation amongst European Muslim minorities (Hammaberg: 2010).18
As noted by Gilbert, ‘a state that persistently fails to recognize the rights of its minorities will
sow the seeds of disloyalty’ (1996: 167).
Additionally, the fear that Muslims in Western Europe threaten national security also
resembles the perception that national minorities are disloyal and irredentist (Kymlicka, 2007:
24). The growth of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, including attacks in Madrid 2004,
London 2005, Copenhagen 2015 and Paris 2015, and the rise of Daesh in the Middle East,
have also led to suggestions that Muslims in Western Europe are disloyal and sympathise with
extremists (Newton Dunn, 2015). Thus, the need to adopt measures to integrate Muslim
minorities in Western Europe has been recognised by the former OSCE High Commissioner
on National Minorities (HCNM), Knut Vollebæk:
In the light of what we have already seen in many places in Europe and after
discussions with many Western European governments, in my opinion we will face
a serious social threat if we do not quickly implement measures in order to
integrate all groups in our society, not least the new. (2008: 5)
Similarly, Kymlicka has noted that the security dimension of minority rights ‘is a non-issue
throughout the established western democracies with respect to historic national minorities
and indigenous peoples, although it remains an issue with respect to certain immigrant
groups, particularly Arab and Muslim groups after 9/11’ (2010: 106).
Consequently, while the situation of Muslim minorities in Western Europe is not
directly comparable to that of national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe and post-
Soviet Union States, there are sufficient similarities to suggest that the application of the
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integrationist provisions of the Copenhagen Document may be beneficial. As Wolff has
stressed ‘[a]t the heart of all of these – past, current, latent, potential – conflicts is a
fundamental lack of social cohesion’ (2013: 70).
2. Integrating Diverse Societies with a view to Conflict Prevention: Participation and
Dialogue
Despite the presence of many national minorities in Western Europe, the specific focus of the
Copenhagen Document has meant that these States have historically been excluded from the
oversight of the OSCE mechanisms. This has been attributed to the fact that these States were
‘generally less willing, and less susceptible to pressure, to allow HCNM engagement in
conflicts in their jurisdictions’ (Wolff, 2013: 63). Moreover, the mandate of the HCNM has
been restricted to prevent oversight of pre-existing conflicts and any situation involving
terrorism, at the request of the United Kingdom and Turkey (Alexanderson, 1997: 52;
Heintze, 2000: 386-7). However, as ‘[m]inority conflicts in Western Europe are doubtless
subject to the same rules as those in Eastern Europe’ (Heintze, 2000: 390), Western European
States would benefit from engaging with the specialised instruments and bodies of the OSCE.
Western European States have recognised the need to improve societal cohesion on the
basis of unrest amongst their Muslim communities (Council of Europe, 2008: 9) and have
linked this to security concerns (Cameron, 2011). However, the approach adopted by many of
these States runs counter to the message of Chapter IV of the Copenhagen Document, which
recognises the nexus between the protection of human rights and conflict prevention (1990:
para 30). Levey submits that ‘in the wake of militant Islam and the moral panic over Muslim
immigration’ there has been a shift towards integration and ‘interculturalism’ in Western
Europe (2012: 218). While the Copenhagen Document recognises that the preservation of
minority identity alongside measures of integration are central to cohesive societies, States
have increasingly conflated integration with assimilation (Xanthaki, 2016: 821-22). This
phenomenon has been recognised, in the context of Western Europe, by the AC-FCNM,19
which has expressed particular concern about Dutch authorities ‘addressing integration issues
mainly through the objective of protecting Dutch national identity’.20 Forced or unwanted
assimilation violates the rights of persons belonging to minorities (UN Commission on
Human Rights, 2005: para 22; Council of Europe, 1995: para 45). Furthermore, such
measures are recognised as decreasing societal cohesion, as noted by Bengoa, ‘[t]he causes of
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fundamentalism are generally to be found in the implementation of such assimilationist
policies, whereby the State refuses to recognize the existence of minority groups within itself
or simply prevents the build-up of a multicultural society’ (2000: para 36). By adopting
assimilationist policies, Western European States are likely to increase the alienation of
Muslim minorities, contrary to the message of the Copenhagen Document.
The Copenhagen Document encourages the adoption of integrationist measures that
allow the participation of persons belonging to minorities as equal members of society, in
conjunction with measures to facilitate the preservation of minority identity. The link between
societal cohesion and conflict prevention has been emphasised by the former HCNM,
Vollebaek: ‘Developing and implementing integration policies should be among the priorities
of all States seeking to accommodate diversity and avoid the risk of conflict developing out of
increased separation and tension between groups in society’ (Ljubljana Guidelines, 2012: 6).
Two provisions that originated in the Copenhagen Document stand out as both innovative and
important in this respect: the right to participate in public affairs (para 35) and what is now
known as the right to intercultural dialogue and tolerance (para 36). Notably, the addition of
these rights extended the scope of minority protection past the two traditional pillars of
minority protection: non-discrimination and equality and the preservation of minority identity
(Henrard, 2000: 8-11).21 They have subsequently been given legal effect through their
formulation as rights in the FCNM.22 This, Ringelheim suggests, ‘bring[s] the FCNM beyond
a mere ideal of peaceful coexistence of majorities and minorities. It is also geared towards
ensuring their inclusion and participation on an equal footing in the society at large’ (2010:
118). While the AC-FCNM has focused on ‘justice’ ahead of ‘security’ (Craig, 2012: 64), the
connection between the achievement of these rights in practice and the security dimension
remains:
Effective integration and conflict prevention are also linked in that they require a
comprehensive approach in terms of the policy areas and people or groups they
involve. Integration and conflict prevention policies, thus, have both horizontal and
vertical dimensions: they need to engage elites and the masses within and across
different population segments and they need to address the specific concerns that
they have (Wolff, 2013: 72).
Whereas the right to effective participation allows minorities ‘to engage elites’, the right to
intercultural dialogue and tolerance encourages engagement ‘within and across different
population segments’. However, not all Western European States have been willing to
recognise that the FCNM extends to Muslim minorities.23 Notably, if Muslims are not
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recognised as falling within the scope of minority rights instruments, equivalent protection is
not available in generally applicable human rights treaties. As the achievement of these
standards has the potential to improve societal cohesion and, in turn, prevent conflict, it is
argued that Western European States would benefit from adopting a similar approach with
respect to their Muslim minorities to that advocated in the Copenhagen Document.
This section evaluates whether the lessons of the Copenhagen Document have been
heeded by Western European States in relation to the integration of their diverse societies.
The content of effective participation and intercultural dialogue and tolerance, as elaborated
by the AC-FCNM, will be considered alongside the extent to which Western European States
have realised these rights in relation to their Muslim minorities. This approach, however, does
not allow for a full elaboration of the implications and potential difficulties faced by States
when striving to implement these standards.
2.1.Effective participation
As citizens and permanent residents of the States in which they live, the majority of European
Muslims are able to vote and participate in democratic processes. However, procedural
inclusion alone is unlikely to enable persons belonging to minorities to influence decisions, as
‘[i]n a democracy, the majority/dominant ethno-cultural group will dictate the relevant
convention’ (Wheatley, 2005: 160). The right to effective participation has been interpreted as
serving the dual purpose of providing the necessary conditions for persons belonging to
minorities to overcome structural inequalities in the political process (Council of Europe,
1995: para 80), and enabling persons belonging to minorities to participate in decisions that
have the potential to impact their culture (Hofmann, 2006: 22; Verstichel, 2009: 253). The
AC-FCNM has therefore stressed that effective participation should allow minorities to
engage in decision-making processes that ‘encompass a wide range of areas, including those
not exclusively dealing with minority issues’.24 If a minority is able to participate on equal
terms with the majority in public life and, in particular, voice the specific concerns of the
community, then it is less likely to resort to non-democratic means (Palermo and Woelk,
2004: 240-41; Verstichel, 2009: 72) and will have increased ownership in and loyalty to the
State (Palermo and Woelk, 2004: 240-41; Hofmann, 2006-07: 6). Thus, effective participation
has the potential to reduce the likelihood of conflict, by providing appropriate fora for persons
belonging to minorities to air grievances.
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Rather than the ‘local or autonomous administrations’ suggested by the Copenhagen
Document, which are more appropriate for national minorities, Hofmann has suggested that
consultative mechanisms are the most appropriate method of enabling the effective
participation of ‘new minorities’ (Hofmann, 2006-07: 16). As a result of their flexibility,
‘consultative mechanisms often prove more effective in transmitting the interests of minority
constituencies into the chain of legislative or political decision-making’ (Weller, 2010: 478-
79). Minority rights monitoring bodies have recognised that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all
approach to minority consultative mechanisms and, consequently, have not been overly
prescriptive in respect of the requirements of such mechanisms (UN Commission on Human
Rights, 2005: para 43; Lund Recommendations, 1999: 25-6 paras 12-13; AC, 2008: paras
113-15). However, the difficulties faced in establishing effective and representative bodies are
particularly apparent in relation to attempts to consult Muslim minorities in Western Europe.
The nature and mandate of consultative mechanisms and the legitimacy of the
representatives consulted have the potential to impact their success. Thus, the AC has
established that ‘[i]t is important to ensure that consultative bodies have a clear legal status,
that the obligation to consult them is entrenched in law and that their involvement in decision-
making processes is of a regular and permanent nature’ (AC, 2008: para 107). Belgium,
France and Germany have established permanent consultative fora specifically for their
Muslim communities,25 whereas the Netherlands and the UK have established consultative
mechanisms with broader mandates, based on ethnic origin26 or religion.27 However, these
attempts to consult Muslim minorities in Western Europe have frequently fallen below the
standard advocated by the AC-FCNM.
The broader platforms established by the Netherlands and UK have been discontinued
in favour of ad hoc consultation mechanisms, which, as noted by the AC-FCNM in the
context of the discontinuation of the Dutch National Consultation Platform on Minorities, do
not satisfy the requirements that ‘participatory structures need to be of a long term and
institutionalised character in order to ensure continuity and to allow for the broader discussion
of minority issues among all concerned’.28 Rather than enabling effective participation, ad
hoc mechanisms have the potential to further disenfranchise and alienate persons belonging to
minorities. This is apparent in the UK, where the AC-FCNM has noted:
[T]he complaints it has received from representatives of minority ethnic
communities of Muslim faith regarding the difficulties they encounter in
establishing a dialogue with the Government. This sense of alienation is reported to
be widespread among representatives of most sections of the Muslim population in
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the United Kingdom, including the Muslim Council of Britain, the largest umbrella
group of Muslim organisations in the country.29
Consequently, if consultation mechanism are to be effective, States must make greater efforts
to ensure that they are permanent, accessible to Muslim minority representatives and have a
broad mandate. While ad hoc mechanisms are problematic, operational concerns have also
been raised in relation to permanent consultation mechanisms. The UN Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination welcomed ‘the establishment of the Islam Conference,
as a forum … with the aim of establishing continuous dialogue to address Islamophobic
tendencies and discuss relevant policy responses’.30 However, in reality, it has been suggested
that Muslim representatives in the German Islam Conference are unable to raise issues of
concern to their communities and influence the outcome of consultation (Amir-Moazami,
2011: 8). The French Council for the Muslim Faith, despite being an elected and permanent
body, has no legal standing.31 This, in turn, has the potential to lead to inconsistency in
consultation and hinder the effectiveness of the body. If minority consultative mechanisms are
unable to influence the decision-making process, they will be perceived by persons belonging
to minorities to constitute a token gesture and lack legitimacy (AC, 2008: para 9; Human
Rights Council, 2009: para 27). Inadequate or insufficient consultation has the potential to
undermine societal cohesion by marginalising minority voices and increasing the alienation of
communities.
The Lund Recommendations and the AC-FCNM have also recognised that the internal
diversity of minorities must be represented, if consultative procedures are to be effective
(Lund Recommendations, 1999: para 12; AC, 2008: paras 110-111). In this respect, the
adoption of democratic methods to appoint minority representatives are preferred, but not
required.32 The AC-FCNM has emphasised that States should consult a variety of minority
associations.33 ‘The “representativeness” of organizations that allegedly represent ethnic
groups or the degree to which organizations can claim to represent the will, interest and
support of its constituents is often variable’ (Malloy, 2007-8: 218). Consequently, States
should avoid privileging one minority representative association to the disadvantage of
others34 as ‘such differential treatment between organisations of minorities is not conducive to
pluralism and internal democracy within minorities’.35 European Muslims are heterogeneous
in nature and, thus, if consultation is to be effective it is important that the variety of opinions,
practices and perspectives within Muslim communities are represented. The failure to consult
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legitimate representatives, who represent the internal diversity of these communities, has the
potential to undermine the purpose of consultation.
In direct contrast to the AC-FCNM’s recommendations, members of formal consultative
mechanisms in the United Kingdom have been unelected,36 and ‘appointed because of their
personal experience and expertise not as representatives of any community or organisation’.37
The legitimacy and representativeness of Muslim representatives at a national (Hellyer, 2007:
236; McLoughlin, 2005: 60) and local level (Vertovec, 2002: 28-9; McLoughlin, 2005: 58-9)
have been called into question. Notably, the 2001 riots in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in
Northern England were attributed to the disenfranchisement of Muslim communities
(Bagguley and Hussain, 2008: 193). Thus, the potential for inadequate consultation to lead to
conflict has already materialised in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, in relation to the
United Kingdom, the AC-FCNM has stressed that ‘[t]here is a clear need to step up
communication and meaningful consultations with a full spectrum of representatives of
Muslim communities, in order to ensure their inclusion in decision-making’.38 Similarly in
relation to the Netherlands, the AC-FCNM has expressed concern that the National
Consultation Platform on Minorities consulted only one representative organisation for each
ethnic minority.39
Even when democratic processes have been adopted, State interference has the potential
to undermine the legitimacy of representatives. The requirement that the Ministry of Justice
approve the democratically elected members of the Muslim Executive of Belgium led ‘almost
half of all the members of the Assembly’ to be vetoed ‘due to their “fundamentalist” leanings’
(Cesari, 2004: 66-7). This is problematic as minority representatives should be appointed in
an open and transparent manner (AC, Commentary 2008: 8; Lund Recommendations, 1999:
26 para 13) and consultative mechanisms should reflect the internal diversity of the minority
(AC, 2008: paras 110-111). Although it is not suggested that States engage with terrorist
organisations, they must engage with a wide spectrum of Muslim representatives, including
those who are perceived to be illiberal, if consultations are to be effective. The vetoing of
elected members of a minority organisation has the potential to leave sections of Muslim
communities unrepresented and removes the opportunity to air grievances. This, again, has
the potential to increase alienation and lead to conflict.
Attempts have been made to consult Muslim minorities in Western European States,
including Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. However,
these mechanisms have consistently been criticised for failing to allow meaningful
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consultation and for not fully reflecting the spectrum of views within the communities they
are supposed to represent. This has the potential to increase alienation, undermine attempts at
societal cohesion and, in turn, increase the prospect of conflict. If the message of the
Copenhagen Document is to be heeded, a more concerted effort to engage Muslim minorities
in Western Europe, through truly representative bodies, is required.
2.2.Intercultural dialogue and tolerance
Even if the requirements of effective participation are satisfied, it is unlikely that the cause of
conflict can be transformed if the majority is not receptive to the perspective of the minority.
Stavenhagen has noted that:
… a dominant ethnie (whether majority or minority) may attempt to impose its
own norms and standards, or its own model of society, on a weaker,
underprivileged minorities (or majority) and encounter resistance when it does so.
Or the dominant majority may feel that the minority has ‘been granted’ or is
demanding ‘too much’ and must be kept in its place. No matter what the apparent
expressions of ethnic conflict may be, and the underlying causes are usually much
more complex, the issues of group interests and groups rights are always at the
center of the debate. (1987: 510)
In order to transform conflict, intercultural dialogue and tolerance play an important role, as
‘the proposition for conflict resolution relies on the transformation of conflictive discourse
through self-reflection and a broadening of dialogue between conflict parties’ (Pia and Diez,
2007: 7). Thus, paragraph 36 of the Copenhagen Document establishes that ‘[e]very
participating State will promote a climate of mutual respect, understanding, co-operation and
solidarity among all persons living on its territory’. Integration policies are key in this respect,
and ‘should promote contact and exchange between communities and individuals through
incentives and by raising awareness of the mutual advantages of interaction, dialogue and
participation’ (Ljubljana Guidelines, 2012: 21). Thus, intercultural dialogue is central to
integration and has the potential to transform relationships between different groups within
Western European societies.
However, the AC-FCNM has expressed concern that the conditions in Western Europe
are not conducive to intercultural dialogue and tolerance. In relation to the Netherlands, for
example, it has expressed concern that the move away from multiculturalism ‘has led to an
increased polarisation of the society whereby minority communities, and in particular persons
belonging to the Muslim population of the Dutch society, tend to be stigmatised’.40 It has also
expressed concern at the rise of right-wing political movements41 and Islamophobic political
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discourse.42 The AC-FCNM has linked intolerance and a lack of intercultural dialogue to
interference with the rights of Muslims, in the form of opposition to and the rejection of
planning permission for mosques,43 the ban on minarets in Switzerland44 and restrictions on
the hijab, burqa and niqab.45 The FCNM, HCNM’s Ljubljana Guidelines and the UN
Declaration on Minorities have recognised that intercultural dialogue and tolerance can be
improved through educational measures and the approach adopted by the media (Council of
Europe, 1995: paras 48-9, 71; UN Commission on Human Rights, 2005: paras 65-9; Ljubljana
Guidelines, 2012: 21-23, 54-55, 60-61).46 Furthermore, the AC-FCNM has increasingly
stressed that politicians have a responsibility to create conditions of intercultural dialogue.47
The Ljubljana Guidelines establish that education serves the dual purpose of the
preservation of minority identity and is ‘one of the most effective ways to promote
intercultural contact and understanding and a shared sense of civic identity’ (2012: 54).
Education within article 4(4) of the UN Declaration on Minorities and article 12(1) of the
FCNM is not limited to the majority being educated about the minority, as integration is a
‘two-way process’. By reducing ignorance of other cultures, languages and religions,
intercultural dialogue has the potential to prevent stereotyping and intolerance against
minorities. However, by requiring that the minority learn about the majority, such education
may also prevent myths and prejudices about the majority from developing within the
minority (Eide, 1998: 13) and, thus, ‘counteract tendencies towards fundamentalist or closed
religious or ethnic groups’ (UN Commission on Human Rights, 2005: paras 65-8).
The AC-FCNM has stressed the importance of interaction between the majority and
minority in the school environment,48 the role of bilingual education,49 and the adoption of
measures to reduce hostility and bullying in order to ensure such interaction.50 It has praised
programmes which seek to increase knowledge of minorities of immigrant origin and the
benefits of diversity.51 For example, the AC-FCNM welcomed ‘the implementation of
innovative experiences to counteract these negative trends, such as the creation by the City of
Barcelona of a “network of anti-rumours agents”, trained to challenge stereotypes that are
spread about immigrants’.52 Nonetheless, it has also recognised that often these measures are
inadequate53 and that a lack of understanding can lead to restrictions on the rights of European
Muslims. Thus, in the context of the Swiss minaret ban, the AC-FCNM noted that ‘during
public debates following the vote on the popular initiative, many people voiced a need for a
better understanding of Islam’.54 Consequently, while steps have been taken to improve
mutual understanding and interaction between Muslim communities and the majority in
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Western Europe, these measures have not gone far enough. As the restriction of the rights of
Muslim minorities has been attributed to a lack of understanding, States must increase their
efforts in the field of education.
The media serves the dual purpose of educating the majority about the minority whilst
creating space for intercultural dialogue to take place (Council of Europe, 1995: 29-34).
Media hostility towards minority concerns has the potential to lead to distrust of both the
majority and the media (Verstichel, 2009: 61), and inhibit minority political participation
(Human Rights Council, 2009: para 30). Consequently, the media has the potential to present
minority claims as a threat to societal security but can also help to desecuritize the minority-
majority relationship. In accordance with the Ljubljana Guidelines, States are required to
encourage the media to promote tolerance and intercultural dialogue and ‘challenge negative
stereotypes and intolerance’ (2012: 60). Moreover, the AC-FCNM has emphasised the
importance of minority representation to ensure that ‘the public is adequately informed …
about political issues relevant to persons belonging to national minorities’ (AC, 2008: 8). This
may require funding for minority media, intercultural initiatives and programmes dealing with
minority issues or as well as minority representation in the mainstream media (Council of
Europe, 1995: para 62).55 The AC-FCNM has welcomed media initiatives with respect to
multicultural education and combatting xenophobia56 and the reporting of minority issues in
an impartial and unbiased manner.57
In contrast, the AC-FCNM has been particularly critical of reporting in the media that is
xenophobic and has the potential to incite hostility58 and hate crime.59 Notably, the AC-
FCNM has expressed concern at the increasing Islamophobic discourse present in Western
European media. In its Opinion on the Fourth Danish State Report, the AC-FCNM
emphasised that in the context of media reporting on Muslims,
…the media analysis indicated that most news stories were restricted to topics such
as extremism, terror, sharia, freedom of speech, democracy versus Islam, and
women’s rights, which contribute to negative stereotyping of Muslims. More
positive topics such as the general contribution of Muslims to Danish society, the
everyday life of the vast majority of Muslims, the value of ethnic, religious and
cultural diversity, and discrimination against Muslims appeared in newspapers less
frequently.60
Similarly, in relation to the Third United Kingdom State Report, the AC-FCNM expressed
concern ‘that a steady rise in hate crimes against Muslims in the United Kingdom, most
notably in London, is being fuelled by a negative discourse being held in the media’.61 Thus,
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further measures are needed to ensure that the media does not promote intolerance and lead to
the marginalisation of Muslim minorities.
The manner in which the media reports right-wing political movements and
Islamophobic discourse also has the potential to be divisive. Thus, ‘[t]he media need to be
mindful of the potential consequences when they report statements made by politicians or
other public figures that contribute to negative stereotyping and other divisive activities’
(Ljubljana Guidelines, 2012: 61). As negative reporting and political speech have the
potential to undermine intercultural dialogue and tolerance, the AC-FCNM has encouraged
States to take proactive steps to combat manifestations of intolerance in the public sphere.
Such measures include ‘legislative measures and policies’62 and ‘initiatives to encourage both
national and regional media outlets to promote more balanced and objective reporting on
issues related to diversity within German society and to strengthen the training of journalists
and other media professionals’. 63 Divisive and Islamophobic political discourse and reporting
has the potential to marginalise and alienate Muslim communities. Nonetheless, the AC-
FCNM has also recognised that measures must be balanced with freedom of expression.
Therefore, it is preferable that the media self-regulate64 and any measures adopted should
ensure freedom of expression and the editorial independence of the media.65
While measures have been adopted to increase societal cohesion in Western European
States, the AC-FCNM has expressed concern that racist and Islamophobic manifestations in
the media and by politicians have increased. Such intolerance directly undermines attempts to
establish dialogue between minorities and the majority and has the potential to lead to the
restriction of the rights of minorities. If the lessons of the Copenhagen Document are to be
learnt and the potential for conflict reduced, Western European States must make concerted
efforts through education and the media to reduce intolerance and the resulting alienation of
their Muslim minorities.
Conclusion
The Copenhagen Document was adopted at a specific time with specific minorities in mind.
However, many of its provisions have subsequently been reiterated in generic minority rights
instruments. The innovations of the Copenhagen Document are relevant not only to ‘national
minorities’ in Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet States, but also to new and
emerging minority situations.
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The situation of Muslims in Western Europe highlights that it is not only ‘national
minorities’ that have the potential to be a security concern. Consequently, this article has
argued that the innovative elements of the Copenhagen Document, to the extent that they
encourage integration and societal cohesion, are relevant to these Muslim minorities.
Paragraph 35 of the Copenhagen Document, the right to effective participation in public
affairs, and paragraph 36, the right to intercultural dialogue and tolerance, are both central to
the integration of these communities and the prevention of future conflict. However, not all
Western European States have recognised that these rights apply to their Muslim minorities
and, where they have, insufficient efforts have been made to give effect to these standards.
Contrary to the message of the Copenhagen Document, Western European States are
increasingly pursuing assimilation rather than integration. Attempts to engage European
Muslims in public affairs have been selective, unrepresentative and tokenistic. Furthermore,
an increase in Islamophobic discourse in the media and political discourse has been reported
alongside inadequate educational measures to facilitate mutual understanding. These issues
alone have the potential to increase the exclusion and alienation of persons belonging to
Muslim minorities. As acknowledged by the Copenhagen Document, if minorities are able to
fully participate as equal members of society, the potential for conflict is reduced. Rather than
adopting assimilationist measures, Western European States should heed the message of the
Copenhagen Document and make a more concerted effort to facilitate the inclusion of Muslim
minorities in their societies.
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